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The Keynesian Arithmetic in War-Time Canada: Development of the National 
Accounts 1939-1945. By Enid Barnett. (Kingston, On.: Harbinger House 
Press, second edition, 2000. 91 p. ISBN 0-9683129-3-4) 
This lively and well-documented monograph examines the construc-
tion of an unofficial set of estimates of Canadian national income and 
expenditure based on Keynes's methodology by a small group of civil 
servants, notably Robert Bryce, John Deutsch, and especially George 
Luxton. Their approach superseded the earlier work of the Dominion 
Bureau of Statistics (based on national accounts methodology devel-
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oped by Simon Kuznets in the United States) as the basis for planning 
war-time production and fiscal policy and, from 1943, postwar recon-
struction. Beyond its immediate topic, Barnett's study sheds light on 
Canadian economic policy-making, the reception of Keynesianism in 
Canada, and the competing approaches to national accounts. 
Through archival research, Barnett uncovers conflicts and interac-
tions only glimpsed in more general works such as David W. Slater's 
War Finance and Reconstruction: The Role of Canada's Department of 
Finance 1939-1946 (Ottawa, 1995). Earlier neglect of this episode 
reflects in part the accident that, while several of those involved 
achieved later prominence (Bryce as Clerk of the Privy Council and 
Deputy Minister of Finance, Deutsch as founding chairman of the 
Economic Council of Canada and Principal of Queen's University), 
the central figure, George Luxton, died in January 1945, at the age of 
thirty. 
Canada's first official national income estimates, for the years 1911 
and 1918, were published by the Dominion Statistician R. H. Coats in 
1919. Further estimates by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (DBS) in 
Canada Year Books from 1922-23 to 1937 measured the output of 
services by arbitrarily assuming that the value of output per employee 
was the same in services as in commodity production. This approach 
was abandoned in the face of efforts sponsored by the Bank of Nova 
Scotia and the Rowell-Sirois Royal Commission on Dominion-Provin-
cial Relations to produce national income estimates incorporated 
direct estimation of services. (Prof. D. C. MacGregor, who produced 
the Bank of Nova Scotia's estimates in 1935, headed the Rowell-Sirois 
Commission's National Income Committee, whose study appeared in 
1939.) The DBS undertook a new study of the National Income of 
Canada 1919-1938 (only Part I of which was published, in 1941), 
based on Kuznets's approach at the National Bureau of Economic 
Research in the US. This provided the basis for national income 
estimates published by the Bureau in the Canada Year Book until 1945, 
but was not well received by the Finance Department, the Bank of 
Canada, or Canada's war-time allies. The crux of the problem was 
estimating income produced by government. Following Kuznets, the 
Bureau in effect treated government as an entrepreneur, with taxes as 
the price paid for its services. In war-time, with much government 
spending financed by borrowing, this understated government 
expenditure and national income by the amount of the budget defi-
cit—that is, by 10 per cent of national income, as John Deutsch (a 
coauthor of the Rowell-Sirois Commission study) estimated in an 
April 1941 critique of the DBS study written for the Governor of the 
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Bank of Canada. A British Treasury note on Canada's contribution to 
the war effort relative to its resources criticised Canada for underesti-
mating its national income and for basing calculations on "theoreti-
cal reasonings and rough estimatings which make it a ridiculous 
method to choose" (Barnett, p. 74, n. 34). In addition to this 
problem of method, the Bureau had only a single junior statistician 
and a clerk working full-time on national income. Sidney Smith, 
the principal author of the 1941 DBS study, was in charge of all 
business statistics, with national income as an additional second-
ary responsibility. 
Deutsch and Bryce persuaded W. Clifford Clark, the Deputy Minis-
ter of Finance, that war-time fiscal policy should rely on national 
income estimates following the methodology of Maynard Keynes's 
How to Pay for the War (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1940), national 
income tables by Keynes's disciples James Meade and Richard Stone 
for the British White Paper on War Finance, and Martin Gilbert's 
Master Table for US national product. Bryce, then secretary of the 
National Economic Committee chaired by Clark, had attended 
Keynes's Cambridge lectures on the general theory of employment 
from 1932 to 1934, and then brought Keynesian economics to Har-
vard (a Keynesian connection which Barnett assumes the reader will 
already know without being told). According to Bryce, the long-serv-
ing Dominion Statistician Coats had little interest in or understand-
ing of national income accounts, so the DBS lacked the institutional 
culture as well as the personnel to create Keynesian national income 
and product accounts (including government spending as a measure 
of income generated by government). Unofficial estimates (classified 
secret or confidential), using the methods of Keynes, Meade, Stone, 
and Gilbert, were produced within the Bank of Canada's Research 
Department, primarily by George Luxton. These, rather than the 
published estimates of the DBS, were used in policy-making by the 
Department of Finance, the Bank of Canada, and later the Depart-
ment of Reconstruction. Publication of the already-completed Part II 
of the DBS study was blocked. Comparability with British and US 
accounts was stressed, and it was accepted that national accounting 
was more advanced in those countries. When Keynes, Meade, and 
Stone expounded the methods of the British White Paper on War 
Finance to the Post-War Economic Talks in London in October and 
November 1942, "none of the Dominion representatives present 
knew enough about the subject to ask anything but superficial ques-
tions" (Barnett, p. 59). Finally, in the summer of 1944, Luxton became 
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Chief of the Planning and Development Staff of the Dominion Bureau 
of Statistics, with responsibility for a new set of national accounts. 
Enid Barnett's concise monograph (of which the first edition 
appeared in 1998) provides a fascinating, well-documented account 
of the bureaucratic and intellectual influences that reshaped Canada's 
national accounts during the Second World War. Much has been 
written about how Keynesianism came to shape Canadian macroeco-
nomic policy-making, with Robert Bryce as a central figure. Now 
Barnett has told the related story of how Keynesian ideas came to 
Canada's national accounts, and has rescued Bryce's war-time associ-
ate George Luxton from undeserved obscurity. Her narrative is also of 
interest as a case study of institutions switching from one intellectual 
approach to another. 
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